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Comments 
THE APPLICATION OF DODD-FRANK’S DUAL 
PREEMPTION STANDARD TO STATE UDAP LAWS 
Michael Bolos* 
In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),
1
 a landmark 
law designed to address the regulatory weaknesses that facilitated the 
financial crisis.  Dodd-Frank made several significant regulatory changes, 
including an amendment to the National Bank Act (“NBA”).  
This comment discusses the dual-preemption analysis created by 
Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the NBA.  Under the new dual-preemption 
analysis, state laws that qualify as “state consumer financial laws” are 
subject to a different preemption procedure than state laws that do not 
qualify as state consumer financial laws.  The comment focuses on several 
issues that arise when determining whether the amended NBA preempts 
state unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) laws.  The main 
conclusion reached through this analysis is that applying the new 
preemption regime adds little clarity to the preemption debate, especially 
with regard to state UDAP laws.  In fact, it is the position of the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) that, since 1996, the OCC has 
adhered to the same standard as articulated in Dodd-Frank and, therefore, 
only minor changes must be made to the OCC’s preemption regulations to 
bring them into compliance with Dodd-Frank.
2
  If the OCC succeeds in 
defending its position, the type and breadth of laws that can be preempted 
will be unlikely to change.  If so, the only alteration Dodd-Frank will make 
 
        *   A special thank you to Kenneth Benton and all others whose insight and assistance 
made this comment possible. 
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 2. See, e.g., Letter from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. 
Thomas R. Carper, SEC Interpretive Letter, 2011 WL 2110224 (May 12, 2011) (stating the 
OCC’s intent to propose amendment of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 and regulations applicable to 
federal savings associations and their subsidiaries, and rescission of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006). 
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to the preemption debate will be the addition of more stringent procedures 
to preempt state consumer financial laws. 
Part I of this comment briefly reviews NBA preemption and the 
OCC’s pre-Dodd-Frank rules for preemption.  This section focuses on how 
Barnett Bank and the OCC’s 2004 preemption rule became the basis for 
assessing national bank preemption.  Part II discusses Dodd-Frank’s 
amendments to the NBA.  Part III addresses unresolved issues with the 
legislation, such as the definition of “state consumer financial law.”  Part 
IV analyzes national bank preemption of state UDAP laws.  Part V 
concludes by looking at the practical effect of Dodd-Frank on national bank 
preemption. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIONAL BANK ACT PREEMPTION 
For nearly 200 years, the United States has adhered to a dual banking 
system composed of federally-chartered national banks and state-chartered 
state banks.
3
  The supremacy of federal law over state law with respect to 
national banking was clearly articulated in the landmark case of McCulloch 
v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court held that “the government of the 
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of 
action.”
4
  Then, in 1864, Congress enacted the NBA, which granted 
national banks enumerated powers and “all such incidental powers as shall 
be necessary to carry on the business of banking . . .”
5
  Since that time, 
federal courts have defended the primacy of federal law, “repeatedly 
ma[king] clear that federal control shields national banking from unduly 
burdensome and duplicative state regulation.”
6
  The Supreme Court in 
Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank clarified that, despite the primacy of federal 
banking laws, national banks are still subject to state laws of general 
application to the extent that such laws do not conflict with the letter or 
general purposes of the NBA.
7
  In recent years, this has resulted in 
numerous states attempting to apply their own laws to national banks, with 
the intention of providing greater consumer protection for their citizens.
8
 
 
 3. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual 
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677 (1988). 
 4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). 
 5. National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008). 
 6. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007). 
 7. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 290 (1896) (stressing that the court’s 
holding does not neutralize state laws that regulate national banks’ contracts, as long as 
those statutes do not collide with federal legislation). 
 8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-387, OCC PREEMPTION RULES: 
OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS 12 (2006) (examining the impact of consumer protection and 
dual dual banking system rules) [hereinafter GAO-06-387]. 
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“It is upon the foundation of the dual banking system and the struggle 
between states and the Federal government to regulate national banks that 
U.S. preemption rules have developed.”  This section discusses the OCC’s 
pre-Dodd-Frank rules regarding preemption of state laws.  Part A addresses 
the OCC’s general preemption authority, focusing on Barnett Bank and the 
OCC’s 2004 preemption rule.  Part B discusses the OCC preemption with 
regard to state UDAP laws. 
A.  The OCC’s Application of National Bank Act Preemption  
Over the years, the OCC has asserted its preemption authority with 
increased vigor.  As the regulatory agency charged with administering the 
NBA, the OCC’s official interpretations of the Act receive Chevron 
deference.
9
  Two significant recent events that have shaped OCC 
preemption are the ruling in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), and the OCC’s 2004 preemption rule. 
 Barnett Bank established the standards for assessing preemption of 
state laws.  An oft-cited standard from Barnett Bank requires that a state 
law cannot “prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s 
exercise of its powers.”
10
  The Court reasoned that “Congress would not 
want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that 
Congress explicitly granted.”
11
  The holding in Barnett Bank “reflect[ed] 
the Court’s view that the national banking laws do not create field 
preemption.”
12
  Thus, the decision reserved for the States the power to 
adopt laws that do not “significantly interfere” with national bank powers.
13
 
In 2004, the OCC used the Barnett Bank language as the foundation to 
create its 2004 preemption rule (“2004 Rule”).
14
  The 2004 rule sought to 
enable national banks to “operate to the full extent of their powers under 
federal law, without interference from inconsistent state laws, consistent 
with the national character of the national banking system . . . .”
15
  Under 
 
 9. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2730 (2009) (noting that 
Chevron, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
gives an agency the discretion to interpret an ambiguously-worded statute differently than a 
court would, “within the limits of reason”). 
 10. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank 
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 1001 
(2006). 
 13. Joseph R. Mason, Robert Kulick & Hal J. Singer, The Economic Impact of 
Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 781, 786 
(2010). 
 14. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904, 1910 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000). 
 15. Id. at 1908. 
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the 2004 Rule, the OCC would preempt state laws that “obstruct, impair, or 
condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise” its federally granted 
powers.
16
  The OCC standard became a concern for consumer groups, state 
attorneys general, some members of Congress, and others opposed to 
national bank preemption because, whereas Barnett Bank called for the 
preemption of state laws that “impair significantly” a federal grant of 
power,
17
 the OCC’s standard removed the word “significantly” and 
replaced it with de facto field preemption.
18
 This appears to permit 
preemption of a state law that impairs federally granted powers to any 
degree.
19
  Reflecting this concern, in 2004, the House Financial Services 
Committee passed a budget resolution stating that the OCC’s 2004 Rule 
“may represent an unprecedented expansion of Federal preemption 
authority.”
20
 
In addition to codifying Barnett Bank, the OCC sought to codify other 
recent judicial decisions and OCC opinions regarding the preemption of 
specific categories of state law.
21
  For example, state laws relating to 
lending disclosure, checking accounts, mortgage origination, and 
mortgage-related activities are preempted under the 2004 Rule.
22
  However, 
despite its attempt to clarify the OCC’s position on preemption, the 2004 
Rule left many uncertainties about the applicability of state laws to national 
banks.
23
 
Nonetheless, recent cases have relied on the 2004 Rule when making 
preemption determinations.  For example, in Rose v. Chase Bank USA, 
N.A., the Ninth Circuit relied on the OCC’s 2004 Rule in finding that 
plaintiffs’ class action against Chase Bank was preempted by the NBA.
24
  
The complaint alleged that Chase violated California Civil Code section 
 
 16. Id. at 1904, 1911–13. 
 17. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). 
 18. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing assorted 
strains of federal preemption that invalidate states’ exercise of their regulatory authority). 
 19. Richard H. Neiman, Managing Preemption and Oversight in a Modernized Dual 
Banking System, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 3 (May 18, 2010); Fisher, supra note 12.  
 20. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 108TH CONG., VIEWS AND ESTIMATES OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES ON MATTERS TO BE SET FORTH IN THE CONCURRENT 
RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 15–16 (Comm. Print 2004). 
 21. Jeremy T. Rosenblum, Dodd-Frank Reform Act: A Sea Change Regarding Federal 
Preemption of State Law, 14 CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP. 9 (2010); GAO-06-387, supra 
note 8. 
 22. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
at 1904. 
 23. GAO-06-387, supra note 8, at 11. 
 24. Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on the 
holdings of Barnett Bank and Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 
U.S. 373 (1954), to conclude that the NBA preempts Cal. Civ. Code § 1748.9, and affirming 
the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–
17209). 
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1748.9 by not including the disclosures required under the Code when 
mailing convenience checks to its credit card holders.
25
  In addition to 
alleging a violation of section 1748.9, plaintiffs also brought two causes of 
action for violation of California’s UDAP law.
26
  Relying in part on the 
2004 Rule, the Ninth Circuit held that all three claims were preempted by 
the NBA.
27
 
However, despite the fears and occasional court decisions, such 
preemption determinations did not widely proliferate after the OCC issued 
its 2004 Rule.  This is in part because the OCC is subject to certain 
procedural requirements under the NBA when issuing preemption 
determinations, in addition to the ones that apply to all federal agencies 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
28
  Under 12 U.S.C. § 43, the OCC 
must provide a notice and comment period before issuing any opinion letter 
or interpretive rule that concludes that a federal law preempts the 
application of a state law to a national bank.
29
 
B.  UDAP PREEMPTION 
Preemption of state UDAP laws has been a difficult issue, with the 
OCC supporting preemption at times and the courts denying preemption at 
other times.
30
  In 2002, the OCC issued an advisory letter that seemed to 
support the applicability of state UDAP laws to national banks.  The letter, 
entitled “Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices,” advised that 
“[t]he consequences of engaging in practices that may be unfair or 
deceptive under federal or state law can include litigation, enforcement 
actions, monetary judgments, and harm to the institution’s reputation.”
31
  
The letter went on to say that “[a] number of state laws prohibit unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices, and such laws may be applicable to insured 
depository institutions.”
32
  Two years later, the OCC sought to clarify the 
 
 25. Id. at 1035. 
 26. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2010). 
 27. Rose, 513 F.3d at 1038. 
 28. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–504, 551–559, 561–570a, 571–584, 591–596 (2000). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1994). 
 30. See, e.g., Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the NBA did not preempt claims against Wachovia Bank for allegedly 
manipulating the posting of transactions to impose overdraft fees); Mann v. TD Bank, N.A., 
No. 09-1062, 2009 WL 3818128 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2009) (holding that the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act applied to TD Bank); White v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 563 F. Supp. 2d 
1358 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act for unfair or 
deceptive business practices by manipulating the posting of transactions to impose overdraft 
fees was not preempted). 
 31. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2002-3, 
GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES (2002). 
 32. Id. at n.2. 
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applicability of state laws in its 2004 rule.
33
  Despite the OCC’s best 
efforts, preemption of state UDAP laws remained unclear.  A 2006 
investigation by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found: 
differing views among state officials with respect to the 
applicability of state consumer protection laws, particularly their 
UDAP laws, to national banks. . . . In one state, a banking 
department official said that the state’s UDAP statute would 
likely be preempted.  In another state, an official said that the 
state’s UDAP statute would not be preempted.  Two other state 
banking department officials were unclear about the status of 
their states’ UDAP laws.
34
 
Ambiguity regarding the applicability of a state law can pose a 
significant problem for all parties.  National banks must know which laws 
they are subject to so they can design appropriate compliance programs.  
Additionally, state legislators and attorneys general must know the limits of 
their authority so they do not expend precious government resources 
enacting laws or pursuing cases that will ultimately be preempted. 
In the absence of sufficient agency guidance, scholars and courts have 
developed their own analytical framework for determining whether state 
UDAP laws should be preempted.
35
  One interpretation of the rules uses a 
two-step approach to analyze whether a state law is susceptible to 
preemption by the National Bank Act.
36
   
First, the court decides whether the state statute qualifies as a “lending 
regulation.”
37
  This inquiry looks to whether:  (i) the type of law is listed 
among the types of preempted state laws under the OCC lending 
preemption rule; (ii) the state law pertains to a subject matter that the 
governing agency regulates, such as permissible terms, lending practices 
and disclosures; or (iii) the object of the state law is to regulate the 
relationship between the institution and the borrower.
38
 
Second, the state law qualifies as a lending regulation, it is can be 
preempted unless it is listed among certain non-preempted state laws (e.g., 
contract, tort, criminal) and has only an incidental effect on the operations 
of national banks.
39
  If the state law does not qualify as a lending 
regulation, then the court will look at whether the state law is of general 
application and non-discriminatory towards a national bank.
40
  If the state 
 
 33. GAO-06-387, supra note 8, at 11. 
 34. Id.  at 16. 
 35. Jeffrey I. Langer, UDAP Preemption for National Banks: The Skies are Cloudy, 12 
CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP. 17 (2009). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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law meets these criteria, then it will not be preempted unless it has more 
than an incidental effect on the operations of national banks.
41
 
Despite these attempts, no universally accepted method for 
determining preemption under the National Bank Act has emerged.  Given 
the breadth of state UDAP laws and the case-by-case analysis that must be 
undertaken, it is clear why the Government Accountability Office 
recommended that the OCC try yet again to “clarify the characteristics of 
state consumer protection laws that would make them subject to federal 
preemption” and to find a way to “improve communication and 
coordination between OCC and state officials with respect to the impact of 
preemption rules . . . .”
42
 
II.  DODD-FRANK PREEMPTION 
A.  The Text 
The following section takes an in-depth look at section 1044 of Dodd-
Frank.  A careful examination of the text and the drafters’ intention 
provides a better understanding of the Act’s dual preemption framework. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress sought to address the 
regulatory lapses that enabled the subprime and predatory lending practices 
that contributed to the financial crisis.  Federal preemption of state laws as 
they apply to national banks was among the issues Congress thought 
needed clarification in order to ensure the financial stability of the U.S. 
economy.  To clarify preemption, Congress enacted Section 1044 of Dodd-
Frank to amend the NBA.  Section 1044 sets forth a framework for 
analyzing NBA preemption as well as procedural requirements for the 
OCC to follow when issuing preemption determinations. 
Although Dodd-Frank claims to return preemption to Barnett Bank,
43
 
it must be noted that the new, Barnett Bank-based preemption standard 
only applies to laws that qualify as “state consumer financial laws.”  As 
U.S. Representative Melissa Bean explained: 
I removed a sentence, previously suggested by the Committee 
that said national banks are to generally comply with State law . . 
. . because I wanted to make clear that the changes in the Act do 
not alter the preemption standards and precedents that apply to 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. GAO-06-387, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
 43. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Johnson) (“it is clear that this legislation is codifying the preemption standard expressed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson Florida Insurance 
Commissioner, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) case”). 
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those State laws which are not State consumer financial laws.
44
 
Thus, the first step in any preemption analysis is determining whether 
the state law qualifies as a “state consumer financial law.”  A state law will 
qualify as a state consumer financial law if it:  (1) “does not directly or 
indirectly discriminate against national banks” and (2) “directly and 
specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms and conditions of any 
financial transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage 
in), or any account related thereto, with respect to a consumer.”
45
 
If the state law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, then it may 
be preempted if it:  (1) has a discriminatory effect on national banks; (2) is 
preempted by a Federal law other than the National Bank Act; or (3) 
prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise of a national bank’s 
powers.
46
 
Preemption determinations made by the OCC regarding state 
consumer financial laws must be made on a “case by case” basis and be 
supported by “substantial evidence.”
47
  Preemption determinations may 
relate to the laws of another state with substantively equivalent terms.  All 
preemption determinations must be made by the Comptroller of the 
Currency and require consultation with the new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.
48
  Additionally, the OCC must review its preemption 
determinations every five years.
49
 
B.  The OCC’s Final Regulations 
On July 20, 2011, the OCC issued its final rule implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Act.
50
  With regard to the preemption standard, the OCC 
revised its regulations to institute the procedural requirements cited above.  
Also, in order to clarify that the OCC considers preemption under the 
Barnett Bank decision, the final rule eliminates the “obstruct, impair, or 
condition” language, leaving only a direct reference to “the decision of the 
Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”
51
  It is important to note that the OCC 
did not remove the section of the 2004 rule which lists categories of state 
 
 44. 155 CONG. REC. E3029-2 (daily ed. Dec 17, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bean). 
 45. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. News Release, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 
Docket ID OCC-2011-0018 (July 20, 2011), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-95a.pdf. 
 51. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 34.3(b) (2011) (eliminating “obstruct, 
impair, or condition” language). 
BOLOS_FINALIZED_SIX (DO NOT DELETE)   
2011] DODD-FRANK’S DUAL PREEMPTION STANDARD 297 
 
laws that do not apply to national bank’s lending and deposit-taking 
activities.
52
 
III.  ISSUES COURTS & THE OCC WILL FACE 
Dodd-Frank was drafted relatively quickly and was intended to cover 
a broad array of areas.  As frequently occurs with complex legislation, 
Dodd-Frank contains many ambiguous provisions.  In the months 
following the passage of Dodd-Frank, the OCC, Congressmen, and other 
organizations and advocates sought to clarify key areas before the law took 
effect in July, 2011.  Although the OCC has released its final rule, the 
debate will almost certainly spill over into the courtroom in the coming 
years.  This section will identify several key areas and explore strategies for 
resolving the preemption ambiguities contained in the legislation. 
A.  Defining “State Consumer Financial Law”  
The dual-preemption regime created by Dodd-Frank hinges entirely 
on whether a state law meets the criteria for a state consumer financial law.  
If a state law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, then the OCC 
must go through the analysis set forth in section 1044.  However, if a state 
law does not qualify as a state consumer financial law, then the OCC can 
rely on its traditional analysis and prior determinations.  Section 1044 
broadly defines state consumer financial law as: 
[A] State law that does not directly or indirectly discriminate 
against national banks and that directly and specifically regulates 
the manner, content, or terms and conditions of any financial 
transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage 
in), or any account related thereto with respect to a consumer.
53
 
The main challenge for this analysis is the lack of legislative or 
judicial history defining the term “state consumer financial law.”  Earlier 
versions of Dodd-Frank, Section 143 of the House Bill and Section 1043 of 
the Senate Bill, both used the more common term, “state consumer law.”  
However, by the final version, “state consumer law” was removed and 
replaced with the new term “state consumer financial law.”
54
  As a result, 
interpreters must rely solely on the language provided in Dodd-Frank to 
create a workable definition of this term. 
Two possible ways to unearth a working definition for the term state 
consumer financial law are to:  (1) compare the term to Dodd-Frank’s 
 
 52. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d) (2011). 
 53. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044. 
 54. H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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definition of “federal consumer financial law”; and (2) break the term into 
its component parts. 
1. State Consumer Financial Laws & Federal Consumer Financial 
Laws 
One way to understand the term “state consumer financial law,” is to 
look at it in context of the phrase “federal consumer financial law,” which 
also appears in Title X of Dodd-Frank.
55
  Under principles of statutory 
construction, it can be argued that a state law modeled after a federal law 
defined under Title X as a “federal consumer financial law” would 
logically qualify as a “state consumer financial law.” 
56
  Section 1002(14) 
defines “federal consumer financial law” as: 
the provisions of this title, the enumerated consumer laws, the 
laws for which authorities are transferred under subtitles F and H, 
and any rule or order prescribed by the Bureau under this title, an 
enumerated consumer law, or pursuant to the authorities 
transferred under subtitles F and H.   The term does not include 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.
57
 
The definition of “enumerated consumer laws” contained in section 
1002(12) lists a number of federal laws, including the Consumer Leasing 
Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Federal Debt Collection 
Practices Act, which would all qualify as federal consumer financial laws.
58
  
One could argue that, since the federal laws listed in section 1002(12) are 
defined in section 1002(14) as “federal consumer financial laws,” state 
laws based on the laws in section 1002(12) should be defined as “state 
consumer financial laws.”  After all, the term “federal” does not modify or 
alter the phrase “consumer financial law.” 
2. State . . . Consumer . . . Financial . . . Law 
In trying to understand the whole, it may be best to define the parts.  
Title X of Dodd-Frank defines “state” as “any State, territory, or possession 
of the United States . . . .”
59
  Although the broad definition of a state is 
clear, Dodd-Frank leaves uncertain whether the smaller subdivisions of the 
 
 55. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14). 
 56. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501 
(1998) (“similar language within the same statutory section must be accorded a consistent 
meaning”). 
 57. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14).  
 58. Id. § 1002(12). 
 59. Id. § 1002(27). 
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state are included for the purposes of defining the term “state consumer 
financial law.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, in referring to appealing criminal 
cases, notes that the “term ‘state’ . . . is all inclusive and intended to include 
not only the state but its political subdivisions, counties, and cities.”
60
  This 
definition would allow county and city laws to qualify as state consumer 
financial laws, requiring the OCC to undergo the more rigorous preemption 
procedures articulated in Title X.  This issue arose during the comments 
process, where commentators “voiced concern that the imposition of an 
overlay of 50 state and an indeterminate number of local government rules . 
. .  would have a costly consequence . . . .”
61
  However, those concerned 
could argue that since numerous other sections in Dodd-Frank include the 
language “of any State or of any political subdivision of a State,” the 
omission of such language here is intentional.
62
 
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in City of Columbus v. 
Ours Garage and Wrecker.
63
  In the case, the Court discussed whether 
municipalities could exercise the authority to issue safety regulations for 
local towing truck operations when the law granted such authority to the 
“authority of a State,” and omitted the language “or a political subdivision 
of a State.”
64
  The Supreme Court found that the law did not bar states from 
delegating to municipalities and other local units the state’s authority to 
establish safety regulations.
65
  The court explained that “[a]bsent a clear 
statement to the contrary, Congress’s reference to the ‘regulatory authority 
of a State’ should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional 
prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent 
parts.”
66
  It would therefore appear that municipality and county laws may 
be defined as “state laws.”  If such laws were included in the definition, 
then the OCC could be forced to make case-by-case determinations of 
consumer financial laws not only from State legislatures, but from all 
subdivisions within every state, territory, or possession of the United 
States. 
Title X of Dodd-Frank defines “consumer” as “an individual or an 
agent, trustee, or representative acting on behalf of an individual.”
67
  This 
definition implies that laws pertaining solely to transactions between banks 
and other business entities cannot qualify as “state consumer financial 
laws.” 
 
 60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (5th ed. 1979). 
 61. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION INTEGRATION, supra note 50. 
 62. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 619, 724, 731, 764 (using the language “of any State 
or of any political subdivision of a State.”) 
 63. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker, 536 U.S. 424 (2002). 
 64. Id. at 428. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 429. 
 67. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(4). 
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The last two terms “financial” and “law” are best understood under the 
definition of “state consumer financial law.”  Section 1044 explains that the 
words, taken together, are intended to cover laws that directly and 
specifically regulate financial transactions and any account related 
thereto.
68
  The only definition of “financial transaction” contained in Dodd-
Frank is found in Title VIII.
69
  Title VIII defines financial transactions as: 
(1) funds transfers; (2) securities contracts; (3) contracts of sale 
of a commodity for future delivery; (4) forward contracts; (5) 
repurchase agreements; (6) swaps; (7) security-based swaps; (8) 
swap agreements; (9) security-based swap agreements; (10) 
foreign exchange contracts; (11) financial derivatives contracts; 
and (12) any similar transaction that the Council determines to be 
a financial transaction for purposes of this title.
70
 
The other phrase that requires careful analysis is the phrase “directly 
and specifically.”
71
  Black’s Law defines “direct” as “[i]mmediate. . . . 
[w]ithout any intervening medium, agency, or influence” and defines 
“specifically” as “explicitly, particularly, [or] definitely.”
72
  The use of both 
terms emphasizes Congress’s intent that only state laws that are explicitly 
intended to regulate financial transactions will qualify as state consumer 
financial laws.  If Congress had intended a broader application, it would 
have used the phrase “directly or indirectly,” as Congress chose to use in 
describing discrimination against national banks.
73
 
Putting these definitions together, it becomes clear that state consumer 
financial laws must relate to individual consumers, not business entities, 
and explicitly intend to regulate financial transactions or related accounts.  
The terms, however, will be subjected to much closer scrutiny as courts are 
forced to assess whether state laws qualify as state consumer financial 
laws. 
B.  Dodd-Frank’s Interpretation of Barnett Bank 
The next issue that arises when analyzing preemption under Dodd-
Frank is understanding exactly what the drafters intended when they 
included the language “prevent or significantly interfere” in section 1044.  
The Court in Barnett Bank used several phrases in explaining the types of 
State laws that would be preempted by the National Bank Act.
74
  The Court 
 
 68. Id. § 1044(a). 
 69. Id. § 801. 
 70. Id. § 803(7)(B). 
 71. Id. § 1044(a). 
 72. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 459, 1398 (6th ed. 1990). 
 73. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a). 
 74. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996). 
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mentions preemption terms such as “irreconcilable conflict,”
75
 “stand as an 
obstacle to,”
76
 “forbid, or to impair significantly”
77
 and “prevent or 
significantly interfere.”
78
  Although the court refers three times to the 
“stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment” language from Hines v. 
Davidowitz,
79
 scholars and legislatures seem to have taken the phrase 
“prevent or significantly interfere”
80
 as the standard for preemption, even 
though the Court only refers to that phrase once in the entire opinion.  In 
1999, Congress used Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere” 
language when drafting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999.
81
  As 
with Dodd-Frank, the GLB Act specifically refers to Barnett Bank as the 
primary case the Act sought to codify. 
However, there is an obvious concern with taking a few words from a 
decision and using it as the definitive legal standard.  In a news release, the 
American Bankers Insurance Association explained that Barnett Bank’s 
“prevent or significantly interfere” language must be read in conjunction 
with the entire decision, including the references to prior Supreme Court 
decisions that use the “impair,” “hamper,” and “encroach” language.
82
  The 
fact that Dodd-Frank only quotes a specific standard from Barnett Bank 
rather than the entire opinion leaves open the an argument that by solely 
using the term “prevent or significantly interfere,” the drafters did not 
intend to codify Barnett Bank but rather sought to create a new standard 
that merely borrows language from Barnett Bank.  This has been the 
position taken by the State of New York Banking Department
83
 and the 
Department of the Treasury.
84
 
This argument is given further credence by the language in section 
1044, which states that state consumer financial laws are preempted “in 
accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of 
[Barnett Bank]. . . .”
85
  The reference to the “legal standard” set forth in 
 
 75. Id. at 31. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 33. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 56 (1941). 
 80. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33. 
 81. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, § 104(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A). 
 82. News Release, American Bankers Insurance Association, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
Preemption of State Insurance Sales Laws Applicable to Banks (June 4, 2002) (on file with 
author). 
 83. Letter from Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendant of Financial Services and Acting 
Superintendant of Banks, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller (June 27, 2011) 
(http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20110629bank/newyork.pdf). 
 84. Letter from George Madison, General Council at the Department of the Treasury, to 
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller (June 27, 2011) (http://cdn.americanbanker.com/ 
media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf). 
 85. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (emphasis 
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Barnett Bank, versus the plural form “legal standards,” could show 
legislative intent to draw out only the “prevent or significantly interfere” 
language from the opinion.  The argument becomes even stronger if the 
Dodd-Frank language was based on section 104(d)(2)(A) of the GLBA Act, 
which clearly states that the provision is to be interpreted “in accordance 
with the legal standards for preemption set forth in [Barnett Bank].”
86
  The 
alteration seems to imply that the language in Dodd-Frank was drafted with 
specific intent to carve out the “prevent or significantly interfere” standard 
from the rest of Barnett Bank. 
The question of whether Dodd-Frank was intended to codify Barnett 
Bank becomes clearer when looking to the debates and materials produced 
during and after the drafting of the Act.  A Senate Report released in April 
10, 2010 clarified that under section 1044, “the standard for preempting 
State consumer financial law would return to what it had been for decades, 
those recognized by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 
U.S. 25 (1996 Barnett), undoing broader standards adopted by rules, orders 
and interpretations issued by the OCC in 2004.”
87
  Although this was an 
attempt to clarify Title X’s adherence to the entirety of the Barnett Bank 
decision, it suggests a grammatical error by first referring to a single 
Barnett Bank “standard” and later using the pronoun “those,” implying 
multiple standards.
88
 
When discussing the Bill in the Senate floor debate on the House-
Senate Conference Committee Report, Senator Dodd, the Chairman of the 
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, stated that “[t]here 
should be no doubt that the legislation codifies the preemption standard 
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”
89
  Although this 
statement, again, has the ambiguity of stating “standard” versus 
“standards,” Senators Carper and Warner further clarified in a letter to 
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner that both the legislation and 
the colloquy on the Senate floor were intended to ensure the entirety of 
Barnett Bank would be used when making preemption determinations.
90
 
Given the conflicting positions taken on the issue, it is appropriate to 
review case law for guidance.  In Association of Banks in Insurance, Inc. v. 
Duryee, the Sixth Circuit applied the “prevent or significantly interfere” 
 
added). 
 86. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, § 104(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) 
(emphasis added). 
 87. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010). 
 88. Id. 
 89. 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02, (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (colloquy between Sen. 
Thomas Carper and Chairman Christopher Dodd). 
 90. Letter from Senators Thomas Carper and Mark Warner to Timothy Geithner, 
Secretary of the Treasury (July 8, 2011), http://www.politico.com/static/PPM170_110 
707_treasurypreemption.html. 
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language contained in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
91
  Although the court 
recognized that Barnett Bank set forth “legal standards for preemption,”
92
 
the court focused on the two prong “prevent or significantly interfere” 
standard.
93
  Nonetheless, in interpreting the language, the court considered 
Barnett Bank’s reference to the decisions in McClellan v. Chipman,
94
 and 
First National Bank v. Kentucky,
95
 which use the “impair the efficiency of,” 
“destroy,” and “hamper,” language.  The court used this understanding to 
reject plaintiff’s argument that “prevent or significantly interfere” means 
“effectively thwart.”
96
  Eight years after Duryee, the Sixth Circuit used the 
same analysis in Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., holding that 
“the level of ‘interference’ that gives rise to preemption under the NBA is 
not very high.”
97
 
The Eleventh Circuit has recently weighed in on the subject.  In 
Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s state law claims as preempted by 
the NBA.
98
  Plaintiff argued that defendant violated a Florida statute that 
specifically prohibited a bank from “settling any check drawn on it 
otherwise than at par” when defendant charged plaintiff a $6.00 fee for 
cashing a check.
99
  The court looked to the Barnett Bank decision as setting 
the standard of conflict preemption.
100
  The court went on to state that “it is 
clear that under the Dodd-Frank Act, the proper preemption test asks 
whether there is a significant conflict between the state and federal statutes 
. . .”
101
  By adhering to the conflict preemption standard, the Eleventh 
Circuit refused to entertain the idea that Dodd-Frank did anything but 
codify Barnett Bank. 
Although the plain text of section 1044 does leave ambiguity as to 
whether the section intended only to codify the “prevents or significantly 
interferes with” language from Barnett Bank, the legislative history and 
judicial background support the OCC’s conclusion that section 1044 
intended to codify the entirety of the Barnett Bank decision.  Further, the 
case law supports the use of the phrase “prevent or significantly interfere” 
and asserts that the language does not pose a very high hurdle for 
preemption determinations. 
 
 91. Ass’n of Banks in Ins., Inc. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 409 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 92. Id. at 405 n.4 (emphasis added). 
      93.  Id. at 409–10. 
 94. McClellan v. Chipman Traders’ Nat’l Bank, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896). 
 95. First Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869). 
 96. Duryee, 270 F.3d at 409. 
 97. Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 98. Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 99. Id. at 1196. 
 100. Id. at 1197. 
 101. Id. 
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C.  Applicability of the OCC’s Prior Determinations  
As discussed, the OCC has issued numerous preemption 
determinations over the years, as well as official interpretations, including 
the OCC’s 2004 Rule.  The April 30, 2010 Senate Report stated that the 
new preemption regime under Dodd-Frank was “undoing broader standards 
adopted by rules, orders and interpretations issued by the OCC in 2004.”
102
  
This raises the issue of what exactly becomes of the legislative and agency 
history surrounding National Bank Act preemption. 
Several areas of the law will not be altered by Title X and therefore, 
prior OCC interpretations and court decisions will still apply.  Since the 
preemption standard created in Title X only applies to “state consumer 
financial laws,” those laws that do not qualify as state consumer financial 
laws will be subject to the preemption standards currently in place.  As 
mentioned in the prior section, since “consumer” is defined as an 
individual, decisions regarding transactions between banks and other 
business entities will not be affected. 
According to the April 30, 2010 Senate Report, those laws that do 
qualify as state consumer financial laws will be subject to a stricter 
standard than has traditionally been applied.  Despite the report’s language, 
it is not readily apparent that a stricter standard has indeed been created.  
Recall that Title X preempts any state law that:  (1) has a discriminatory 
effect on national banks; (2) is preempted by a federal law other than the 
National Bank Act; or (3) prevents or significantly interferes with the 
exercise of a national bank’s powers.
103
  The first prong will be analyzed in 
the next subsection.  The second prong has always been a clear case of 
preemption.  The third prong is, as discussed above, arguably a codification 
of Barnett Bank, and would appear to be the basis for the Senate Report’s 
conclusion that a stricter standard has been created. 
However, the third prong does not seem to alter the OCC’s analysis in 
the slightest.  In the Federal Register notice for its 2004 Rule on 
preemption authority, the OCC stated that it adopted the language 
“obstruct, impair, or condition . . . . as the distillation of the various 
preemption constructs articulated by the Supreme Court, as recognized in 
Hines and Barnett Bank, and not as a replacement construct that is in any 
way inconsistent with those standards.”
104
  In a 2003 letter from John 
Hawke, the then Comptroller of the Currency, to Senator Sarbanes, Hawke 
states that “[t]he OCC scrupulously follows [Barnett Bank] and other 
applicable precedents when we evaluate a national bank preemption 
 
 102. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010). 
 103. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) . 
 104. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904-01, 1910 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
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issue.”
105
  And then again in May of 2011, Acting Comptroller Walsh wrote 
that “the conflict preemption principles of the Supreme Court’s Barnett 
[Bank] decision are the governing standard for national bank 
preemption.”
106
 
In its final rule the OCC admitted that “the obstruct, impair, or 
condition” language in the 2004 rule “created confusion and 
misunderstanding,” and agreed to remove the language.
107
  Despite the 
change, the OCC reaffirmed its position that, “the specific types of laws 
cited in the [2004 rule] are consistent with the standard for conflict 
preemption in the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision,” adding that further 
requests to review the 2004 rule are inappropriate, because Dodd-Frank 
only applies to determinations made after the Act’s effective date of July 
21, 2011.
108
 
In the OCC’s opinion, it has scrupulously adhered to Barnett Bank.  If 
this is truly the case, then all prior OCC determinations will survive judicial 
review under the “new” three-prong standard and remain in place even if a 
law qualifies as a state consumer financial law.
109
  In fact, the addition of 
“discriminatory effect” as possible grounds for preemption would seem to 
provide the OCC a broader standard than it has traditionally been working 
under. 
D.  What is “Discriminatory Effect”?  
The decision in Title X to demarcate “discriminatory effect” as 
grounds for preemption is significant.  The language appears to be 
borrowed from the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994, which gave the Comptroller of the Currency the 
 
 105. Letter from John Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Paul Sarbanes 
(December 9, 2003), http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/SarbanesPreemption 
letter.pdf. 
 106. Letter from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Thomas R. 
Carper, (May 12, 2011) (internal quotations omitted), 
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents /may11/int1132.pdf. 
 107. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION INTEGRATION, supra note 50, at 26.  In a footnote, 
the OCC commented that the change should not affect prior preemption determinations 
since no prior OCC-issued preemption precedent rested solely on the “obstruct, impair, or 
condition” formulation. Id. at 43556 n.43.  By including this explanation, the OCC seems to 
implicitly acknowledge that there exists a difference between Barnett Bank and the OCC’s 
formulation.  If such a difference exists, then the OCC needs to look beyond preemption 
determinations that rely solely on the “obstruct, impair, or condition” formulation, and 
assess instances where the OCC’s formulation may have significantly influenced the 
preemption determination. 
 108. Id. at 43558. 
 109. If and when the OCC’s determinations with regard to state consumer financial laws 
are challenged and reviewed by a court, they will no longer be afforded Chevron deference. 
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authority to preempt state laws that have a discriminatory effect on national 
bank branches.
110
  The use of this language in Title X now appears to 
broaden that authority beyond just national bank branches. 
The language not only appears to expand the OCC’s preemption 
authority, but the addition may also create a redundancy in Dodd-Frank’s 
preemption analysis.  First, a law cannot qualify as a state consumer 
financial law if it “directly or indirectly discriminate[s] against national 
banks.”
111
  Then, if a state law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, it 
will be preempted if it “has a discriminatory effect on national banks in 
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by that State.”
112
  
One would think that a state law that has a discriminatory effect on national 
banks would never reach the Dodd-Frank preemption standards for state 
consumer financial laws, because by discriminating against a national bank 
the state law would not qualify as a state consumer financial law.  This 
would be a strong argument for the redundancy of the two standards. 
However, it is well-established canon of statutory construction that a 
statute should not be read in a way that makes any part of the statute 
redundant.
113
  Differences in the language must be read to indicate 
differences between the two standards.  The key difference between the 
two is that the first standard refers to “direct or indirect” discrimination, 
whereas the second standard focuses on the “discriminatory effect” of the 
state law.  However, this does not help the analysis.  The first standard 
seems to cast a wider net than the second.  Whereas the second standard 
only looks to discriminatory effects against national banks, the first 
standard seems to allow the OCC to look at direct and indirect 
discrimination, including discriminatory effects as they relate to state banks 
and any other competing financial institutions. 
One way to reconcile this issue is to analogize the two standards to the 
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.
114
  Under Title VII, a plaintiff can make a prima facie case that 
employment discrimination has occurred by showing either disparate 
treatment or disparate impact.
115
  Disparate treatment occurs when there is 
deliberate discrimination (i.e. discriminatory intent).
116
  Disparate impact 
 
 110. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 
36(f)(1)(A)(ii). 
 111. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (reaffirming  the “cardinal 
principle” that statutes should be read to be construed “so no clause, sentence, or word shall 
be superfluous, void, or insignificant”). 
 114. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). 
 116. See Lewis v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2010) (“For disparate-treatment 
claims . . . plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate discrimination within the limitations 
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covers “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a 
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities.”
117
  The Supreme Court in 
Lewis v. City of Chicago explained that, although the terms seem similar, 
“[t]he effect of applying Title VII’s text is that some claims that would be 
doomed under one theory will survive under the other. . . .”
118
 
Applying this framework to Dodd-Frank, one can analogize the 
“directly or indirectly discriminates” language in Dodd-Frank to Title VII’s 
disparate treatment.  Under this logic, a law that deliberately discriminates 
against national banks would not qualify as a state consumer financial law.  
This would leave the second Dodd-Frank standard regarding the 
“discriminatory effect” of a state law to be applied in a similar way as Title 
VII’s disparate impact.  Thus, a law that may have no discriminatory intent 
may still be preempted because the law has a disproportionately adverse 
effect on national banks in comparison to state banks. 
Interpreting Dodd-Frank in this manner eliminates the seeming 
redundancy in the law.
119
  The first standard would be used specifically to 
analyze whether a law qualifies as a state consumer financial law will have 
a specific application and prevent laws that have discriminatory intent from 
qualifying as state consumer financial laws.  Then, should a law qualify as 
a state consumer financial law, the OCC and the courts will judge it under 
the broader second standard of “discriminatory effect” by looking beyond 
the intent of the law and assessing its impact on national banks. 
IV.  PREEMPTION ANALYSIS FOR STATE UDAP LAWS 
As previously discussed, state UDAP laws have had a long, confused 
history of preemption.  This Section of the comment will build off of the 
understanding of “state consumer financial” law created in Section III, the 
other interpretations proposed in Section III, and the language of section 
1044 to assess what preemption framework state UDAP laws may be 
analyzed under, and whether, under that framework, state UDAP laws will 
be preempted. 
A.  Congressional Intent  
A unique issue arises with the applicability of state UDAP laws.  In 
early versions of the Dodd-Frank Act (which in the House was called the 
 
period.”). 
 117. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009). 
 118. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199. 
 119. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will 
avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.” (citing United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955))). 
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Consumer Financial Protection Commission Act, H.R. 3126), section 143 
of the House Bill amended the National Bank Act to read: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law and except as 
provided in subsection (d), any consumer protection provision in 
State consumer laws of general application, including any law 
relating to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, any consumer 
fraud law and repossession, foreclosure, and collection law, shall 
apply to any national bank.
120
 
However, after December 9, 2009, the term “state consumer law” was 
scrapped for the term “state consumer financial law,” and the language 
relating to state UDAP laws was removed.  The implications of the removal 
of the reference is open to interpretation.  One interpretation may be that 
the consideration and removal of the UDAP language shows intent by 
Congress to preempt state UDAP laws.  According to the Congressional 
Research Service, courts may attribute significance to the fact that 
Congress considered and rejected bill language that would have adopted 
the very position at issue.
121
 
Under this interpretation, the fact that Congress initially included state 
UDAP laws and then removed the language could show Congressional 
intent to preempt such laws.  However, previous cases that advanced such 
an argument were bolstered by further evidence from Congress regarding 
why the language was removed.  For example, in Pacific Gas and Electric 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission 
the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 preempted a state statute conditioning the construction of nuclear 
power plants on a finding of adequate means of disposal of nuclear 
waste.
122
  In deciding the issue, the Court looked to the federal legislation, 
particularly the decision of the House not to adopt an amendment requiring 
nuclear power plants to have facilities for disposal of spent fuel and high-
level nuclear waste.
123
  After rejecting the amendment, Rep. Ottinger stated 
that the language was deleted “to insure that there be no preemption.”
124
  
Considering this information, the court found that “[w]hile we are correctly 
reluctant to draw inferences from the failure of Congress to act, it would, in 
this case, appear improper for us to give a reading to the Act that Congress 
considered and rejected.”
125
 
 
 120. H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 143 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 121. YULE KIM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 42 (2008). 
 122. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 194–95 (1983). 
 123. Id. at 220. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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Unfortunately, in the case of state UDAP preemption, the legislative 
history is insufficient to determine why Congress removed the reference to 
state UDAP laws.  One alternative interpretation may simply be that 
Congress thought the term state consumer financial law clearly 
encompassed state UDAP laws and therefore the addition of the language 
would be redundant.  Without further insight into Congress’s intent, the 
argument that Congress showed its desire to preempt state UDAP laws by 
changing the language of the statute would probably be rejected by a 
reviewing court. 
B.  Preemption Analysis for State UDAP  
Without statutory language indicating Congressional intent, state 
UDAP laws are probably subject to the dual preemption framework 
reserved for all other state laws.  As discussed, the two main steps in the 
dual preemption analysis are:  (1) discovering whether the state UDAP law 
qualifies as a “state consumer financial law” and then, based on the 
outcome, (2) applying the appropriate preemption standards. 
1. Does It Qualify As a “State Consumer Financial Law”?    
The first step in the preemption analysis is to determine whether the 
state UDAP law qualifies as a state consumer financial law.  The previous 
section discussed two methods for assessing whether a state law may 
qualify as a state consumer financial law:  (1) use of the term “federal 
consumer financial law” as an indicator for what types of state laws are 
“consumer financial laws”; and (2) use of the definition of state consumer 
financial law provided in section 1044(a) as well as the definition of each 
word. 
Looking first at the definition of “federal consumer financial law,” 
arguments can be made on both sides as to whether a state UDAP law 
would qualify as a state consumer financial law.  The first possible clue 
comes in the section 1002(14) definition, which specifically says that the 
Federal Trade Commission Act is not a federal consumer financial law.
126
  
State UDAP laws are often based on Section 5(a) of FTC Act,
127
 and are 
sometimes referred to as “mini-FTCs.”
128
  Thus, an argument can be made 
that since the FTC does not qualify as a consumer financial law, mini-FTCs 
should not qualify either. 
 
 126. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 127. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). 
   128.  See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public 
Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 
24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 674 (2007-2008). 
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However, §1002(14) is not the only part of the legislation that speaks 
to the FTC Act.  However, state mini-FTCs are based on section 5(a) of the 
FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices.  Section 
1031 of Dodd-Frank specifically addresses federal UDAP law (i.e., §5(a) of 
the FTC Act), charging the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
with the power to “prevent a covered person or service provider from 
committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice 
under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a 
consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer 
financial product or service.”
129
  Since §1011 and §1012 state that the 
Bureau’s responsibility is to regulate federal consumer financial law, a 
strong argument can be made that section 1031 (and therefore §5(a) of the 
FTC Act) qualifies as a federal consumer financial law.
130
  Therefore, state 
UDAP laws, which are based on §5(a) of the FTC Act, should qualify as 
state consumer financial laws.   
With the comparative analysis providing an unsatisfactory result, the 
next method would be to breakdown section 1044’s definition of state 
consumer financial law and look for clues.  Section 1044(a) requires that a 
state consumer financial law:  (1) not directly or indirectly discriminate 
against national banks and (2) specifically regulate the manner, content, or 
terms and conditions of any financial transaction.
131
 
Applying the understanding of “directly or indirectly discriminate” 
developed in section III.D, a state UDAP law does not qualify as a state 
consumer financial law if the intent of the law is to discriminate against 
national banks.
132
  Given the broad applicability of state UDAP laws, it 
would be surprising and unlikely to see a state UDAP law intentionally 
discriminate against national banks.  Thus, the first part of the state 
consumer financial law definition need not be discussed further. 
The second requirement is that the state UDAP law “directly and 
specifically” regulate financial transactions.  There is one additional 
element to this definition implied by the statute.  As discussed in the prior 
section, the word “consumer” in the term “state consumer financial law” 
implies that the law must regulate the transaction of individual consumers, 
rather than corporate transactions.  A large majority of state UDAP law 
provisions cover individual transactions.  Thus, the analysis hinges on 
whether the law “directly and specifically regulate[s] the manner, content 
or terms and conditions of any financial transaction. . . .”
133
  One must 
therefore show that state UDAP laws directly and specifically regulate 
 
 129. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031. 
 130. Id. §§ 1011–12. 
 131. Id. § 1044(a). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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financial transactions in order for them to qualify as state consumer 
financial laws. 
By prohibiting the terms of financial transactions from being unfair or 
deceptive, state UDAP laws arguably regulate the manner, content, and 
terms of financial transactions.  A state UDAP law’s ability to directly and 
specifically regulate a transaction is not altered merely because it covers a 
broad category of transactions. 
However, commentators have called into question the extent to which 
state UDAP laws of general application can directly and specifically 
regulate financial transactions or accounts.
134
  As discussed in Section III, 
the combination of the terms “directly” and “specifically” connotes a clear 
desire that a state law must expressly intend to cover consumer financial 
transactions in order to qualify as a state consumer financial law.  Barnett 
Bank provides insight into analyzing the term “specifically.”  In deciding 
whether a federal statute specifically related to the business of insurance, 
the Supreme Court explained that although “the general words ‘business 
activity,’ for example, will sometimes include, and thereby implicitly refer, 
to insurance; the particular words ‘finance, banking, and insurance’ make 
the reference explicitly and specifically.”
135
  The Court further clarified that 
“[m]any federal statutes with potentially pre-emptive effect . . . use general 
language that does not appear to ‘specifically relate’ to insurance . . . .”
136
  
Applying Barnett Bank’s understanding of “specifically relates,” generally 
applicable state laws could not satisfy the less stringent “specifically 
relates” standard, let alone the arguably more stringent “directly and 
specifically regulates” standard contained in Title X. 
State UDAP laws of general applicability would probably not have 
clear enough intent to regulate consumer financial transactions and would 
therefore be subject to the current preemption regime. 
2. If the Law Qualifies as a State Consumer Financial Law, Is It 
Preempted Under the Three Prong Dodd-Frank Test?  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that state UDAP laws do indeed 
qualify as state consumer financial laws, then preemption is determined by 
the three-prong test set forth in section 1044 of Dodd-Frank.  Under the 
Dodd-Frank test, a state consumer financial law may be preempted if it:  
(1) has a discriminatory effect on national banks; (2) is preempted by a 
federal law other than certain portions of the NBA; or (3) prevents or 
significantly interferes with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.
137
 
 
 134. Rosenblum, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
 135. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A.  v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996). 
 136. Id. at 42. 
 137. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1044(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
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Under the first prong of the Dodd-Frank test, the state consumer 
financial law cannot have a discriminatory effect on national banks.
138
  
Following the proposed analysis discussed in Section III, to have a 
discriminatory effect (i.e., disparate impact), a state UDAP law need only 
disproportionately impact national banks as compared to state banks.  State 
UDAP laws broadly apply to a number of transactions, including those 
conducted by state banks.
139
  Therefore, most state UDAP laws could not 
be said to have a discriminatory effect on national banks. 
Under the second prong, the state law must not be preempted by a 
federal law other than Title 62 of the Revised Statutes, commonly known 
as the NBA.
140
  Although section 5 of the FTC Act covers unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices, nothing in the law specifically preempts state 
UDAP laws.  However, several laws outside of section 5 may preempt a 
state UDAP law.  For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
141
 the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
142
 and even parts of the NBA outside of Title 
62
143
 contain regulations that could preempt an overreaching state UDAP 
law.  Therefore, a broad review of relevant federal laws is required to 
satisfy the third prong. 
Under the third prong, the state law must comply with the legal 
standard set forth in Barnett Bank, in that the state law cannot prevent or 
significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.
144
  As 
discussed, state legislatures typically model UDAP laws after Section 5 of 
the FTC Act, although they may contain additions, such as a private right 
of action.  State UDAP laws generally do not forbid activities authorized by 
federal statute, because federal statutes, namely §5 of the FTC Act, forbid 
much of the same conduct.
145
  The OCC’s 2002 advisory letter bolsters this 
argument with its statement that national banks may be subject to state 
UDAP laws.
146
  If the OCC has indeed been working under the framework 
of Barnett Bank and applicable case law, then most state UDAP laws 
would not be preempted by prong three.  However, since Barnett Bank 
remains the standard under Dodd-Frank, the debate surrounding the 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g. CAROLYN CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER INC., CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND 
PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (2009) (discussing how consumer issues surrounding mortgages and 
lending can be brought under state UDAP statutes). 
 140. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1044(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006). 
 142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6781 (2000). 
 143. 12 U.S.C. §§ 38, 92a, 371 (2006). 
 144. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044. 
 145. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A., v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (discussing 
explicit and conflict preemption). 
 146. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2002-3, 
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, at 1 (2002). 
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preemption of state UDAP laws remains as uncertain as it did pre-Dodd-
Frank.  
It is worth noting that since the first prong (i.e., discriminatory effect) 
is rarely at issue, it is of little importance whether state UDAP laws qualify 
as state consumer financial laws.  Whether or not the law qualifies as a 
state consumer financial rule, the law would still be subject to preemption 
by other federal laws (prong two) as well as preemption under the standard 
set forth in Barnett Bank (prong three).  Unless the OCC or the courts 
determine that the first prong has a more inclusive interpretation, it is 
largely irrelevant whether a state law qualifies as a state consumer financial 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The amendments to the NBA codified in section 1044 of Dodd-Frank 
have added a new set of procedures for OCC preemption determinations.  
This comment sought to shed light on those procedures and any substantive 
changes the amendments might have made to the preemption analysis. 
Section I summarized the pre-Dodd-Frank standards for OCC 
preemption.  In the coming years, the OCC will surely face scrutiny 
regarding its adherence to Barnett Bank and other standards.  In the pre-
Dodd-Frank era, state UDAP laws’ applicability to national banks was 
unclear. 
Section II addressed the text of Dodd-Frank and the new procedures 
required for laws that qualify as state consumer financial laws.  Section III 
then identified several parts of the law that will likely come under close 
scrutiny in the future.  The issues surrounding (1) the definition of the new 
term “state consumer financial law,” (2) Dodd-Frank’s interpretation of 
Barnett Bank, (3) the applicability of the OCC’s prior regulations, and (4) 
the application of the “discriminatory effect” language, are significant and 
can substantively alter the preemption analysis. 
Based on this comment’s assessment of these issues, Dodd-Frank does 
little to change preemption in a substantive manner.
147
  Whether or not a 
law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, the standard for preemption 
remains the standard that was used in Barnett Bank.  Additionally, whether 
or not the rule qualifies as a state consumer financial law, it is still subject 
to preemption by other federal laws outside of Title 62 of the Revised 
Statutes.  The wild card in the preemption debate is the manner in which 
 
 147. Section 1044 does provide a number of new procedural requirements when 
preempting a law that qualifies as a state consumer financial law.  The OCC must make 
preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis, consult with the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection before preempting state consumer financial laws, and review all 
preemption determinations every five years.  Dodd Frank Act §§ 1044(b)–(d). 
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the OCC and the courts will interpret the “indirect or direct discrimination” 
and “discriminatory effect” language to avoid redundancy in the law. 
Section IV used the insight from the prior sections to understand how 
state UDAP laws may be processed under Dodd-Frank.  From the analysis, 
many state UDAP laws are too broad to “directly and specifically regulate” 
consumer financial transactions and would therefore not qualify as state 
consumer financial laws.  This would place state UDAP laws outside the 
new preemption procedures in Dodd-Frank, leaving state UDAP laws 
subject to the same uncertain preemption regime in which they have 
operated for years. 
The new dual preemption standard is still in its infancy and the OCC 
has just recently published its proposed final rule interpreting section 
1044’s amendments to the NBA.
148
  Given the desires of the OCC to 
maintain its preemption authority and state governments to enact their own 
standards for institutions operating within their borders, it is certain that the 
language contained in Section 1044 will soon be the subject of multiple 
legal disputes.  The intention of this article has been to provide a starting 
point for the discussion of the changing landscape of national bank 
preemption of state UDAP laws. 
  
 
 148. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 140 (proposed May 26, 2011) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000(a)–(b)). 
BOLOS_FINALIZED_SIX (DO NOT DELETE)   
2011] DODD-FRANK’S DUAL PREEMPTION STANDARD 315 
 
  
BOLOS_FINALIZED_SIX (DO NOT DELETE)   
316 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
